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Abstract—We investigate the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF)
of the wiretap and the K user Gaussian broadcast channels with
multiple antennas at the transmitter, the legitimate receivers and
an unknown number of eavesdroppers each with a number of
antennas less than or equal to a known value NE . The channel
matrices between the legitimate transmitter and the receivers
are available everywhere, while the legitimate pair have no
information about the eavesdroppers’ channels. We provide the
exact sum SDoF for the considered system. A new comprehensive
upperbound is deduced and a new achievable scheme based
on utilizing jamming is exploited. We prove that cooperative
jamming is SDoF optimal even without the eavesdropper CSI
available at the transmitters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The noisy wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner
[1], in which a legitimate transmitter (Alice) wishes to
send a message to a legitimate receiver (Bob), and hide
it from an eavesdropper (Eve). Wyner proved that Alice
can send positive secured rate using channel coding. He
derived capacity-equivocation region for the degraded wiretap
channel, then the generalization to the general wiretap channel
was done by Csiszar and Korner [2]. Leung-Yan- Cheong
and Hellman [3] then extended the results to the Gaussian
wiretap channel case.
Substantial work was done hereafter to study the infor-
mation theoretic physical layer security for different network
models. The relay assisted wiretap channel was studied in [4].
The degrees of freedom (DoF) region of multiple access chan-
nel was presented in [15]. Using MIMO systems for securing
the message was an intuitive extension due to the spatial gain
provided by multiple antennas. The MIMO wiretap channel
was studied in [5]–[13] and the secrecy capacity was identified
in [8]. All these previous works assumed the availability of
either partial or complete channel state information (CSI).
Given that the eavesdropper is passive, it is more practical
to assume that the eavesdropper CSI is completely unknown.
Papers [10], [11] study the secrecy capacity and secure DoF
for different MIMO channels when the eavesdropper channel
is arbitrarily varying and its channel states are known to the
eavesdropper only.
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Meanwhile, the idea of cooperative jamming was proposed
in [9], where some of the K–single antenna transmitters jam
the eavesdropper by transmitting independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noise to improve the sum secrecy
rate. Cooperative jamming was then used for deriving the
SDoF for different networks. In [15], cooperative jamming
was used to zero the DoF decoded by the eavesdropper and
prove that the MAC channel with single antenna nodes has
K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 DoF.
Inspired by cooperative jamming, we devise a technique
called partial jamming, where some of the transmitter’s DoF
are used to send jamming signals, while the remaining DoF are
used for secure signal transmission. We utilize partial jamming
to investigate the MIMO wiretap channel, the 2–user MIMO
broadcast channel and K–user MIMO symmetric1 broadcast
channel with unknown eavesdroppers’ CSI at the transmitter
and receivers, under fading eavesdroppers’ channels. We pro-
vide a new upperbound for the achievable SDoF and determine
the exact sum SDoF by providing an achievable scheme. We
show that our scheme is optimal and that the achievable bound
and the new upperbound are tight. Compared to previous art,
the novelty of this work can be summarized as follows:
• We prove that knowledge of eavesdropper’s CSI does not
increase SDoF for the presented channel models,
• For the case of known eavesdropper channels with con-
stant or time varying channels, we show that it has the
same sum SDoF as the previous case,
• We incorporate the more general scenario of multiple
eavesdroppers,
• No restrictions are assumed on the relation between the
number of antennas at the transmitter and the receivers,
• We address the general case where all the eigenvalues of
the legitimate channel have non-zero values2,
• For the special case of a single eavesdropper, our pro-
posed scheme achieves a sum SDoF superior to those
reported in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the
1The term symmetric is used to indicate the case of equal number of
antennas at all receivers
2The cases where some of the eigenvalues are equal to zero represent special
degraded cases of the more general non-zero eigenvalues case, where the
SDoF decreases for every zero eigenvalue till it collapses to the trivial case
of zero SDoF for all-zero eigenvalues.
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2system model and the secrecy constraints. The main results are
presented in Section III. In Section IV, the new upperbound is
derived and the achievable scheme is presented in Section V.
The paper is concluded in Section VI. We use the following
notation, a for vectors, A for matrices, A† for the hermitian
transpose of A, [A]+ for the maxA, 0 and Null(A) to define
the nullspace of A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider two communication systems, the MIMO wire-
tap channel (Fig. 1-a) and the MIMO broadcast channel with
a single transmitter and K receivers (Fig. 1-b), all with the
existence of unknown number, Q, of passive eavesdroppers.
In both systems, the transmitter is equipped with M antennas
while receiver i is equipped with Ni antennas. The jth
eavesdropper is equipped with NEj ≤ NE antennas.
Let x denote the M × 1 vector of Gaussian i.i.d coded
symbols to be transmitted by the transmitter. We can write the
received signal at the ith legitimate receiver at time (sample)
l as
yi(l) = HiVx(l) + ni(l) (1)
where Hi is the Ni ×M matrix containing the channel coef-
ficients independently drawn from a continuous distribution
from the transmitter to the receiver i, i ∈ 1 : K for the
BC channel and i = 1 for the MIMO wiretap channel. The
received signal at the jth eavesdropper is
zj(l) = Gj(l)Vx(l) + nEj(l), (2)
where Gj(l) is the NEj ×M matrix containing the the i.i.d
time varying channel coefficients from transmitter i to the
eavesdropper j drawn from a continuous distribution with
mean η and variance σ2e , V is the precoding unitary matrix (i.e.
VV† = I) at the transmitter, n(l) and nEj(l) are the N×1 and
the NEj × 1 additive white Gaussian noise vectors with zero
mean and variance σ2 at the legitimate receiver and the jth
eavesdropper, respectively. It is assumed that the maximum
number of antennas any eavesdropper can possess; namely,
NE , is known to the transmitter, while the eavesdroppers’
channels, Gj(l), are unknown. We focus on the case NE < M
to avoid the trivial zero SDoF case.
We define the M × 1 channel input from the legitimate
transmitter as
x¯(l) = Vx(l). (3)
The transmitter intends to send a message Wi to legitimate
receiver i over n channel uses (samples) simultaneously while
preventing the eavesdroppers from decoding the message. The
encoding occurs under a constrained power given by
E
{
x¯x¯†
} ≤ P (4)
Expanding the notations over n channel extensions we have
Hni = Hi(1),Hi(2), . . . ,Hi(n),
Gnj = Gj(1),Gj(2), . . . ,Gj(n)
and similarly the time extended channel input, Xn, time
extended channel output at legitimate receiver i, Yni and time
Fig. 1: System model
extended channel output at eavesdropper j, Znj as well as noise
at legitimate receiver, nn and noise at eavesdroppers, nnEj .
At each transmitter, the message Wi is uniformly and
independently chosen from a set of possible secret messages
for receiver i, Wi = {1, 2, . . . , 2nRi}. The rate for message
Wi is Ri , 1n log |Wi|, where | · | denotes the cardinality
of the set. The transmitter uses a stochastic encoding function
f : W1,W2, . . . ,WK −→ Xn to map the secret messages into
a transmitted symbol. The receiver i has a decoding function
φ : Yni −→ Wˆi, where Wˆi is an estimate of Wi.
Definition 1. A secure rate tuple (R1, R2, . . . , RK) is said to
be achievable if for any  > 0 there exist n-length codes such
that the legitimate receiver can decode the messages reliably,
i.e.,
Pr{(W1,W2, . . . ,WK) 6= (Wˆ1, Wˆ2 . . . , WˆK)} ≤  (5)
and the messages are kept information-theoretically secure
against the eavesdroppers, i.e.,
H(W1,W2 . . . ,WK |Znj ) ≥ H(Wˆ1, Wˆ2, . . . , WˆK)−  (6)
H(Wi|Znj ) ≥ H(Wˆi)−  ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ..,K} (7)
where H(·) is the Entropy function and (6) implies the
secrecy for any subset S ⊂ {1, 2, ..,K} of messages including
individual messages [15].
Definition 2. The sum SDoF is defined as
Ds = lim
P→∞
sup
∑
i
Ri
1
2 logP
, (8)
3where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rate tuples
(R1, R2, . . . , RK), Ds = d1 + d2 + . . . + dK , and di is the
SDoF of receiver i.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Theorem 1. The SDoF of the MIMO wiretap channel is
dw =
{
M −NE , for M ≤ N1 +NE
N1, for M > N1 +NE
, (9)
the SDoF region of the two user BC channel is
dbc1 ≤ min(N1,M −NE)
dbc2 ≤ min(N2,M −NE)
dbc1 + d
bc
2 ≤ min(N1 +N2,M −NE)
 if M ≥ N1 ≥ N2
dbc2 ≤ min(N2,M −NE)
dbc1 + d
bc
2 ≤M −NE
}
if N2 < M ≤ N1
dbc1 + d
bc
2 ≤M −NE if M < N2 ≤ N1 (10)
and the sum SDoF of the K user symmetric BC channel is
Dbc =
K∑
i=1
dbci = min(M −NE ,KN) (11)
Proof: The converse proof for this theorem is provided in
Section IV, while the achievability is provided in Section V.
IV. CONVERSE
We will first derive the upperbound for the broadcast
channel case and then derive the MIMO wiretap channel
upperbound as a special case achieved by setting Yi to null
for i ∈ {2, ..,K}.
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ I(W1,W2, . . . ,WK ; Yn1 ,Yn2 , . . . ,YnK)
−I(W1,W2, . . . ,WK ; Zn)
≤ I(W1,W2, . . . ,WK ; Yn1 ,Yn2 , . . . ,YnK ,Zn)
−I(W1,W2, . . . ,WK ; Zn)
= I(W1,W2, . . . ,WK ; Y
n
1 ,Y
n
2 , . . . ,Y
n
K |Zn)
≤ I(Xn; Yn1 ,Yn2 , . . . ,YnK |Zn)
= h(Yn1 ,Y
n
2 , . . . ,Y
n
K |Zn)
−h(Yn1 ,Yn2 , . . . ,YnK |Zn,Xn)
= h(Yn1 ,Y
n
2 , . . . ,Y
n
K |Zn)− h(nn1 ,nn2 , . . . ,nnK)
= h(Yn1 ,Y
n
2 , . . . ,Y
n
K ,Z
n)− h(Zn) + C1
≤ h(Xn,Yn1 ,Yn2 , . . . ,YnK ,Zn)− h(Zn) + C1
= h(Xn) + h(Yn1 ,Y
n
2 , . . . ,Y
n
K ,Z
n|Xn)− h(Zn)
+C1
= h(Xn)− h(Zn) + C2
≤
M∑
m=1
h(xnm)− h(Zn) + C2 (12)
where xnm is the mth row of X
n and xm is the mth value of
x. Let B be a permutation matrix when multiplied by z results
in a vector z¯ with the mth element (m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M})
depending on xm and em, where em are constants depending
on B and Gi : i∈{1,2,...,K}.
z¯ = Bz =

e1x1
e2x2
...
eNE−1xNE−1
eNExNE + ..+ eMxM

+ BnE (13)
and,
h(z¯) = h(z) + log |B| (14)
Substituting (14) into (12),
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ n
M∑
m=1
h(xm)− nh(z¯)
+ log |B|+ C2
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤
M∑
m=1
h(xm)−
NE−1∑
m=1
h(emxm)
− h
(
M−NE+1∑
m=1
em+NE−1xm+NE−1
)
− h(nE) + C3
= (M −NE + 1) logP
− log
(
||[eNE . . . eM ]||2 P
)
+ C4
Consequently, the SDoF of the wiretap channel, which is
calculated by setting {Yi = 0, i ∈ 2, ...,K} is upperbounded
as
Dw ≤ M−NE (15)
and the sum SDoF of the broadcast channel is upperbounded
as
Dbc ≤M −NE . (16)
Given the fact that any receiver i has only Ni antennas, the
SDoF of the wiretap channel is upperbounded as
Dw ≤ min(M −NE , N1), (17)
while the SDoF region of the broadcast channel is upper-
bounded as
dbci ≤ min(M −NE , Ni)∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ..,K} (18)
Dbc ≤ min(M −NE ,
∑K
i=1Ni) (19)
V. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
For securing the legitimate messages, the transmitter sends
NE jamming signal vector r with random symbols. Hence, the
transmitted coded signal can be broken into legitimate signal,
4s, and jamming signal, r, such that
x =
[
s
r
]
.
Accordingly, the precoder, V can be also broken into legiti-
mate, VL, and jamming, VJ precoders such that
V =
[
VL VJ
]
.
Choosing VJ to be the unitary matrix, the jamming power
becomes P J = E{tr(xJxJ†)} = αP , where α is a constant
controlled by the transmitter.
Proposition 1. The jamming signal, xJ , overwhelms the
signal space of the eavesdropper with the strongest channel,
and the eavesdropper ends up decoding zero DoF of the
legitimate messages. Accordingly, weaker eavesdroppers can
decode zero DoF of the legitimate messages.
Proof:
nRe ≤ I(Zn; Sn)
= h(Zn)− h(Zn|Sn)
Re = h(Z)− h(G(VLs + VJr) + nE |s)
= h(Z)− h(GVJr + nE)
≤ 1
2
log
∣∣Iσ2 + (GVE{xx†}V†G†)∣∣
|Iσ2 + (GVJE{rr†}VJ†G†)|
≤ C, (20)
where C is a constant that does not depend on P and known
to the transmitter. Therefor,
lim
P−→∞
Re(P )
1
2 log2 P
≤ lim
P−→∞
C
1
2 log2 P
= 0,
Remark 1. The constant eavesdropper rate comes from the
fact that P J is controlled by the transmitter. Hence, setting
P J = αP for some constant α, we guarantee a constant SNR
at the eavesdropper and a constant rate independent of P .
While the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper channel,
it knows the maximum value of the effective channels created
by the jamming Geff = GV
GVJr+INEσ
. The value of |Geff|2 is
upperbounded by a constant Ceff, where
Ceff = lim
gk,l−→∞,
k∈{1,..,NE},
j∈{1,..,Mi}
|Geff|2, (21)
and gk,l is the element in the kth row and lth column of G.
The transmitter uses the rate difference to transmit perfectly
secure messages using a stochastic encoder similar to the one
described in [18] according to the worst case scenario rate, C,
for the strongest eavesdropper. Using results in [18], for some
Ui projecting the signal at a jamming free space at receiver i
the achievable secrecy sum rate can be lowerbounded by
K∑
i=1
Ri≥ 12 log
∣∣∣I +∑Ki=1(UiHiVE{ss}†V†H†iU†i )∣∣∣−Re
≥ 12 log
∣∣∣I +∑Ki=1(UiHiVE{ss†}V†H†iU†i )∣∣∣−C(22)
As Re is upperbounded by a constant for all values of
G and P , a positive secrecy rate, which is monotonically
increasing with P , is achieved. Computing the SDoF boils
down to calculating the degrees of freedom for the first term
in the right hand side of (22), which represents the receiver
DoF after jamming is applied.
With the eavesdropper completely blocked, it remains to
show how the jamming signal directions are designed to
achieve the maximum possible SDoF for the different regions
stemming from relations between (M,N1, N2, ..., NK , NE).
A. MIMO wiretap channel
1) Achievability for M ≥ N1 + NE: For this region, the
transmitter sends VJ in the null space of the receiver channel.
VJ = Null(H1) (23)
This leaves the receiver with N1 SDoF to decode and the
upperbound is achieved.
2) Achievability for N1 ≤M < N1 +NE: For this region,
the transmitter sends a jamming signal using precoder V J
composed of two parts to block the eavesdropper,
VJ = [VJ1 V
J
2 ] . (24)
The first part VJ1 is sent in the null space of the receiver
channel, as in (23), with size M × J1, where J1 = M −N1,
while the second part, VJ2 , is chosen randomly with size M×
J2, where J2 = NE − J1. Consequently, the transmitter has
M −NE available transmit directions, while the receiver has
at least M − NE jamming–free receive directions to decode
the M−NE securely transmitted streams and the upperbound
is achieved.
3) Achievability for M < N1: For this region, the
transmitter chooses VJ randomly, while this would jam some
of the receiver space, this wont decrease the DoF because it
is constrained by the transmit antennas3. The receiver zero
forces the jamming signal using the post-processing matrix
U as in (25). Accordingly, M − NE SDoF can be sent and
decoded by the receiver.
U = [I− aa−1], (25)
where
a = HVJ . (26)
3This is due to the fact that in this region, M −NE ≤ N1 −NE .
5Fig. 2: Sum SDof of: a) wiretap channel and b,c,d) two receiver
broadcast channel, where for b) M ≥ N1 > N2, c) N1 ≥M > N2
and d) N1 ≥ N2 ≥M /
B. The Two User Broadcast Channel
1) Achievability for broadcast channel: M ≥ N1 ≥ N2:
For this region, the transmitter and both receivers agree on
dedicated space for decoding at each receiver with sizes d1
and d2 for receivers one and two, respectively. The transmitter
sends a jamming signal using precoder VJ in the null space
of the union of the two dedicated decoding spaces. Let A1
and A2 be the decoding spaces of receiver one and two,
respectively. Let U1 and U2 be the post processing matrices
that project the received signal into A1 and A2, respectively.
VJ = Null([U1H1; U2H2]) (27)
Proposition 2. For this scheme the following region is achiev-
able
dbc1 ≤ min(N1,M −NE)
dbc2 ≤ min(N2,M −NE)
dbc1 + d
bc
2 ≤ min(N1 +N2,M −NE) (28)
Proof: The size of the nullspace in (27) is M−dbc1 −dbc2 ,
however, for blocking the eavesdropper the nullspace size must
be NE . Therefor,
M − dbc1 + dbc2 = NE ⇒ dbc1 + dbc2 = M −NE . (29)
It is easy to see that if N1 + N2 < M − NE , the nullspace
of the the receivers’ channels can accommodate a jamming
signal with size NE . Hence, N1 +N2 SDoF is achieved.
2) Achievability for broadcast channel: N2 < M ≤ N1:
For this region, the jamming signal is divided into two parts
as in (24). The first part is of size J1 = M−N2 and is sent in
the nullspace of the second receiver’s channel, thus, generating
interference of size J1 at the first receiver. The second part,
with size J2 = NE − J1, is sent in random direction, hence,
generating interference at both receivers. Consequently, the
achievable region is
dbc2 ≤ min(N2,M −NE)
dbc1 + d
bc
2 ≤M −NE (30)
3) Achievability for broadcast channel: M < N2 ≤ N1:
For this region, the jamming signal direction is totally ran-
domly chosen, and the SDoF region is
dbc1 + d
bc
2 ≤M −NE (31)
C. K–user broadcast channel
Consider the case of K–user broadcast channel with M
transmit antennas and N receive antennas at each receiver.
Achievability: For this system, the transmitter and the re-
ceivers agree on a decoding space, A =
⋃K
i=1Ai, of size
min(M − NE ,KN), where Ai is the decoding space for
receiver i. Let Ui be the li × N postprocessing matrix
projecting the received signal into Ai. The jamming signal
is transmitted in the nullspace of A. Therefor,
VJ = Null([U1H1; U2H2 · · ·UKHK ]) (32)
and li represents the SDoF of receiver i such that
∑K
i=1 li =
min(M −NE ,KN). Hence,
K∑
i=1
dbci =
{
M −NE M ≤ KN +NE ,
KN M > KN +NE .
(33)
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the wiretap and the broadcast channel with
multiple antennas at the transmitter, legitimate receivers and
eavesdroppers in the existence of unknown eavesdroppers. A
new upperbound was established and a new achievable DoF
region was provided, the secure DoF regions were identified.
We proved that transmitter sent jamming is SDoF optimal even
if it has no eavesdroppers’ CSI.
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